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Making space for a new picture of the world: Boys in Zinc and Chernobyl Prayer by 
Svetlana Alexievich.  
Abstract 
Based on a study of Boys in Zinc and Chernobyl Prayer, two books by the Nobel Laureate 
Svetlana Alexievich, this paper’s core argument is that Alexievich’s writing represents an 
approach designed to capture that which eludes more conventional journalism. The paper seeks 
first to situate the subjects of Alexievich’s work in the wider media historical context of the end 
of the USSR, and also to argue that her writing is part of a uniquely Russian concept of 
journalism as literature--a concept that has its historical roots in the autocratic Russia of the 19th 
century. The paper further proposes that conflicts between the preternatural and the material, and 
between elite and non-elite voices--key themes of the works studied – are vital to understanding 
the age of change which Alexievich, through her use of extensive interviews, was seeking to 
record. It emphasizes the significance of the Soviet experience in World War II as an influence 
on the USSR for the remainder of its existence. It posits that Alexievich’s work also casts 
valuable light on the nature of journalism in the last years of the Soviet era – and concludes, 
while acknowledging certain criticisms and questioning of her presentation of her material, by 
arguing that it represents a way to understand new and bewildering times.  
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Introduction  
“They’ve confiscated the past. I don’t have any past. Or any belief…How can I live?” the 
former civilian employee of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan asks in Svetlana Alexievich’s 
Boys in Zinc1. The shattering Soviet experience of the campaign of “internationalist duty” in 
Afghanistan coincided with a time when the mighty monolith of Marxism-Leninism was itself 
creaking under the pressures of change. The Soviet Union would only last two years after the 
withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. On their return, the troops found themselves 
misunderstood, and occasionally even mocked. One artilleryman complains of a young cousin 
who “sneers” at his medals, while “at his age, my heart used to skip a beat when my granddad put 
on his red-letter-day jacket with his ribbons and medals. While we were fighting out there, the 
world changed.”2  
The world which Alexievich describes is one in which everything was changing. That which 
was valued before, that which was trusted, was disappearing. A sense of insecurity, of having 
been deceived, runs through the stories of all those she interviews. Svetlana Alexievich’s 
contributors (the literary nature of her work might make the case for the word “characters” here, 
but Alexievich’s literary approach has its roots in reporting) witness the end of a country, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which they had always been told – and, in many cases, 
believed – was the greatest on earth. In the case of the nuclear disaster which is the subject of 
Chernobyl Prayer (translated as Voices from Chernobyl in English), the second of Alexievich’s 
works which is studied in this paper, the USSR not only ceases to exist politically, part of it does 
physically, too: the nuclear power station itself, and the villages in the area closest to it. 
Alexievich took on the task of telling these stories, and those of the military and other personnel 
who joined, or were forced into, the Soviet Union’s military adventure in Afghanistan and the 
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Chernobyl debacle, all this at a time when the Soviet/ Russian media environment was changing 
with bewildering speed, too.  
This paper’s core argument is that Alexievich’s work represents an approach designed to 
capture that which may elude more conventional journalism. It seeks first to situate the subjects 
of Alexievich’s work in the wider media historical context of the end of the USSR. It argues that 
her writing is part of a particularly Russian concept of journalism as literature – a concept that 
has its historical roots in the autocratic Russia of the 19th century. While acknowledging certain 
criticisms and questioning of Alexievich’s presentation of her material, the paper also argues that 
Alexievich is establishing new foundations for public debate in order to make sense, it must be 
emphasized, of a new and strange world in Russia at the time. The approach she takes includes 
writing about and acknowledging the growing influence of renascent religion, and even 
superstition. It draws on the Soviet mythology of the Great Patriotic (Second World) War as a 
means of describing and understanding the disasters of the age. The technique is to employ old, 
familiar stories, and journalistic methods, in new ways. “Content ruptures form,”3 as the author 
herself put it. The purpose is to understand new and bewildering times.    
 
 
Russian media systems in transition   
After becoming General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, Mikhail 
Gorbachev embarked on his programme of perestroika (reconstruction). A central plank of this 
was glasnost’ (openness), in effect, unprecedented licence to speak frankly in public about 
failings of the Soviet system. Yet the next few years led not to the reinvigoration of the Marxist-
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Leninist system--as Gorbachev had intended--but to its demise. The USSR collapsed in 1991. At 
the outset, though, perestroika was intended as “a return to a modernised version of several 
major strands in the Soviet past,” as R. W. Davies has described it. “On this basis, Gorbachev 
argued, the ‘socialist choice made in 1917’ would be reaffirmed and renewed.”4 To help him get 
his message across, Gorbachev enlisted the help of the news media. In one sense, this was also a 
Leninist approach. The first Soviet leader had himself identified “propaganda, agitation, and 
organization”5 as the key functions of political media. Here, Gorbachev adapted Leninist use of 
the media not to dissuade people from questioning the system, but instead to allow journalists to 
criticize. This led to a curious age in which, “with the sanction of the general secretary, 
journalists also attacked the party establishment.”6 As the reform period progressed, and “the 
well-being of Soviet citizens continued to deteriorate”7, the relationship began to sour. 
At the same time--and this is key for an understanding of the environment of change 
which Alexievich’s sources experienced, and in which she was talking to them--the power of 
print was declining. Television had since its inception been an important medium in a country 
the size of the Soviet Union, but the citizens of the USSR had also been great consumers of 
newspapers. This began to change as the transformation from the strict planned economy gave 
way to cautious liberalization, and eventually to the chaotic and brutal capitalism of the 1990s. 
As Terhi Rantanen put it, “In the Soviet period, the joint circulation of the central newspapers 
amounted to 100 million copies daily, but in 1991-1992, the circulation of the most popular 
dailies reached only twenty to twenty-four million copies.”8 Elena Vartanova has pointed out that 
“the ruination of the postal distribution system”9 was a significant factor in this drastic decline. 
Anyone who stood in the queue in a Russian post office in the early 1990s, on the day when 
newspaper subscriptions could be taken out or renewed, would easily recognize that a system 
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which was inefficient at the best of times could hardly work at all without the postal system 
functioning properly. In fact, the lines themselves were telling about the way the system had 
ceased to function. Time-rich, and cash-poor, pensioners might find their own subscriptions paid 
for by people who could afford the roubles, but who were in too much of a rush to wait in the 
queue (a few extra roubles to smooth over any unforeseen minor difficulties in the process would 
not hurt, either--bribes could sometimes buy a way through the chaos).  
While the print media and the postal system struggled with inefficiency,  television was 
growing ever more important--and was, from the mid-1990s, “the most important mass 
medium”10. This age of the end of a superpower was a fascinating time for journalists, whether 
those let off the Leninist leash to look at the seamier side of Soviet society, or the foreign 
correspondents given greater permission than ever before to see the USSR. For those living 
through that period--Alexievich’s sources--the appeal was less clear cut, not least in the sphere of 
their own media consumption. The previously forbidden fruit of foreign soap operas--“The Rich 
also Cry” from Mexico was a particular favourite11--proved an irresistible draw. Add to that the 
new distractions of advertising based on techniques developed in the capitalist world--and, most 
importantly, the challenge of putting food on the table in times of massive inflation--and it is less 
surprising that the circulation figures of the exciting early years of reform fell away.  
As will be discussed later, during the times of the crises recorded in the books studied in this 
paper there were also failures of Soviet/Russian journalism itself. Brian McNair, in the USSR 
researching his own book Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media, found himself 
experiencing the sensation of being kept in the dark in a way that only a totalitarian regime might 
accomplish. “Like the great majority of people living in the USSR, I first heard the name 
“Chernobyl” on the night of Monday April 28th, nearly three full days after the explosion 
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occurred.”12 In any disaster, not making public what has happened may prevent mass panic, 
initially at least. The longer-term effects of the disaster are no less deadly, of course. In 
consequence of that explosion, not only was the nuclear power plant destroyed, but the whole of 
the surrounding area became the “Prohibited Zone”, where villages were evacuated, and farms 
left without labourers or livestock. In Chernobyl Prayer, the absences in these dead villages and 
fields are the most chilling. Faced with this post-apocalyptic scene, Alexievich’s employs her 
characteristic particular technique--carefully selecting extracts from an interview--to have the 
interviewee describe what the reader has almost certainly never seen, and will struggle to 
imagine. For example, one member of a military unit sent to help with the clean-up operation 
after the disaster described a day in the evacuation zone. “The village street, not a soul…At first 
there were lights still on in the houses, but then they switched off the electricity.” Even here, the 
symbols of the Soviet system, abandoned, endure. The soldier saw “red flags in the collective-
farm offices, all these brand-new pennants, piles of certificates embossed with the profiles of 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin.” The overall impression left by the abandoned village is, “Like some 
warrior tribe had moved on from its makeshift camp.” This is what struck him hardest of all. 
“Chernobyl blew my mind. It got me thinking.”13  
 
The Russian Journalist as Writer and Thinker 
Getting people to think and see the world in a new light is indeed what Alexievich’s work 
is designed to do, and in this we can detect the literary intentions of her journalism. In Russia, 
the link between literature and journalism is especially strong, and Alexievich’s writing is part of 
a much longer literary and journalistic tradition. As Hartsock has persuasively put it, “Alexievich 
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firmly plants herself in the tradition of Russian literature,”14. While this is a move which might 
seem unusual, even presumptuous, in the English-speaking world, Russia has tended to see its 
writers differently. “In a country lacking free institutions, literature--hampered though it was by 
censorship--yet offered some scope for airing political and social opinions. Hence the Russian 
tradition of looking on the writer as a sage who might perhaps solve the riddle of existence,” As 
Ronald Hingley has observed.15 Moreover, Russia has tended often to identify its journalists as 
literary writers. As Vartanova has argued of Russia in the nineteenth century, “The Russian 
vision of literature presupposed a much broader social and cultural role for it than in other 
countries, thus often merging it with journalistic activity.”16 For the military failure and nuclear 
disaster of the late twentieth century, Alexievich has reversed the process, but retained the wider 
social significance. Her journalism merges into literature, and, in book form rather than in 
newspapers, redevelops for new times the role of her nineteenth century Russian counterparts, 
laying “down foundations for public debates.”17 So even if her method is to draw on the 
“hundreds of voices”18 which she described in her Nobel lecture as having surrounded her since 
childhood, her own is still heard--even if rarely directly. 
To read her work is to wonder sometimes where the reporter is in this journalistic work. 
For long periods, it feels like one of the many absences felt so keenly in Chernobyl Prayer. Yet 
occasionally, she appears, offering words of reflection on journalistic practice, and insight into 
the way her own voice frames those who, while talking for themselves, speak at great length 
about her own purpose as an author and journalist. “I didn’t want to write about war any more. 
But here I am in a genuine war,”19 she wearily tells her reader after she has arrived in Kabul. 
Alexievich seems to know, though, that her role as a journalist/author demands that she take on 
the writer’s task all the same. In the pages which follow, as she reflects on the task which lies 
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before her on her assignment in Afghanistan, she makes multiple references to the writers who 
have given Russian literature its worldwide reputation. “To write to tell the whole truth about 
yourself is, as Pushkin remarked, a physical impossibility.”20 Many reporters, even when writing 
long-form journalism, resist such reflexive references. For Alexievich’s kind of journalism, for 
the journalistic culture to which she belongs, this is not an option. Her voice must be heard. Her 
audience expects her to “lay down foundations for public debates,” as Vartanova described it. 
Alexievich draws richly from Russian literature in this reflective section to evoke history: not 
only literary history, but military and cultural history. Discussing “the cruelty with which the 
mujahedeen treat Russian prisoners,”21 Alexievich refers to “the actions of the mountain 
tribesmen” in Lermontov”s A Hero of Our Time. The reference cannot be chosen only for its 
literary quality. Citing a work set during Russian wars of conquest in the Caucasus in the 
nineteenth century also has the effect of commenting on the campaign in Afghanistan. The 
implication is surely that here, too, as in the Caucasus in the previous century, Russian troops are 
facing an enemy whose culture they do not understand in a hostile mountain environment to 
which they are not accustomed. Nor does Alexievich confine herself to drawing on Russian 
literature, even if those references dominate. In this same section, which follows her arrival in 
Kabul, as she tries to convey “the prosy mundaneness of war” she cites Apollinaire, “Que la 
guerre est jolie.”22 The whole effect is to emphasize Russian culture’s great attachment to 
literature, especially its own. It comes almost to be something expected of journalists. In 
Chernobyl Prayer, even a cameraman, working in a purely visual medium, talks of his literary 
influences. “I went out there, my head filled with what they’d taught us: you only become a real 
author in war, and all that. My favourite author was Hemingway, my favourite book A Farewell 
to Arms.”23  
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In this book, as in Boys in Zinc, the author’s voice is largely absent--save for a section 
towards the beginning where she sets out the challenges she feels she faces, and how she will 
meet them. In Boys in Zinc, it is the discussion of her feelings on arrival in Kabul. In Chernobyl 
Prayer, it is the chapter in which, “The author interviews herself on missing history and why 
Chernobyl calls our view of the world into question”24 (italics in original). On both occasions 
when the author permits herself to reflect publicly on her work, the chapters in which she does so 
follow shocking accounts of suffering. In Chernobyl Prayer, it is the story of a woman whose 
husband, a firefighter, has died in agony from exposure to massive amounts of radiation. In Boys 
in Zinc, it is the story of a mother whose son, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, has committed 
murder after his return to the Soviet Union. Alexievich gives the sources their voices, then--as 
her readers, shaken by what they have just read, try to collect themselves-- addresses the readers 
herself. As she does so, she seems to step down from the pedestal of writer/philosopher/prophet 
upon which Russian literary and journalistic culture has sometimes placed reporters. Suddenly, 
she is much closer to the people. In the case of Chernobyl Prayer, geography also has placed her 
physically close to disaster. Alexievich is from Belarus--which, bordering Ukraine, suffered 
dreadful consequences from the accident--a fact not lost on her interlocutor in this passage. 
Stepping down from the lofty viewpoint of “writer as sage” does not remove the obligation to 
fulfil the role. In this case, proximity brings a greater expectation from readers   
A year after the disaster, someone asked me, “Everybody is writing. But you live here 
and write nothing. Why?” The truth was that I had no idea how to write about it, what 
method to use, what approach to take. If earlier, when I wrote my books, I would pore 
over the suffering of others, now my life and I have become part of the event. Fused 
together, leaving me unable to get any distance.25  
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Perhaps she does not need to be directly engaged. Having placed these reflective passages 
after the grim episodes which, as examined earlier, are the openings to both books, Alexievich’s 
work draws its strength from its proximity to the ordinary people to whom she gives voice. Her 
entire technique is to amplify non-elite voices. Perhaps there is also an element here of a trait 
Hugh Kenner identified in Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia. “Political discourse being feverish 
with newspeak, he concocted his plain style to reduce its temperature.”26  In a Soviet society 
where instruction and interpretation were handed down from on high, elite voices--and non-elite 
voices which served to confirm elite statements--shoved everything else out of public discourse. 
Now, as the Soviet Communist Party’s decades of power came to an end, the non-elite voices 
shoved back. Alexievich’s selection of sources enables this process. Elite voices--whether those 
of military commanders in Afghanistan, or of politicians in Moscow--are only heard at a 
distance, and readily contradicted. “It was only after the May Day celebrations were over that 
Gorbachev appeared,” on television, observed a member of a folk choir (the disaster happened in 
the early hours of 26th April, so the official silence lasted for days), before concluding, of the glib 
assurances that “there was nothing to worry about”, “And we believed him.” 27. One detects a 
strong sense of betrayal, which has in turn led to bitterness.  
There are some elite voices in Chernobyl Prayer, such as former senior members of the 
Institute of Atomic Energy, Belarus Academy of Sciences28, but generally Alexievich’s sources 
describe the catastrophic events they have experienced from a more modest--and therefore more 
dangerous--level. There are far more private soldiers than senior officers among the military 
sources; far more firefighters and cleaners than Professors of Nuclear Physics. Those who are in 
more senior positions are characterized by the scale of their disillusionment being 
proportionately greater. In Boys in Zinc, a major, the commander of a battalion, was shouted at 
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on a visit to a cemetery by the mother of a soldier. Her rage was prompted by the fact that he had 
survived, even if he did “have grey hair.” Her son, by contrast, was so young that he “had never 
even shaved.”29 The major has lost his faith in the dying system. “I just can’t stand there with my 
boys any longer and feed them propaganda,”30 he concluded. Vladimir Matveyevich Ivanov, 
former First Secretary of a Communist Party District committee, called himself “a committed 
Communist”31, yet he concluded his account of his experiences with a confession that he was 
reading the work of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, one of the regime’s most determined critics, and 
had himself--despite having obeyed instructions from on high to convey the message that all was 
well--personally experienced as a result of the disaster consequences far more devastating than 
the major’s loss of faith. “Now we’ve been written off by history, as if we don’t exist. I’m 
reading Solzhenitsyn now…I think…(Silence.) My granddaughter has leukaemia…I’ve paid for 
everything. A high price…”32 Ivanov’s age is not given, but if he is a grandfather, it seems 
reasonable to assume that he is in his late forties at the very least--just the generation suffering 
the most from the transition to what he terms, “Wild West capitalism”.33 It is as if, in its death 
throes, the Marxist-Leninist system was finally, and unintentionally, achieving one of its aims: 
taking away the privileges of elites. “Wild West capitalism” is no respecter of status in the Party. 
Vladimir Matveyevich is suffering along with everyone else.  
Faith, magic, and materialism 
Alexievich’s work is built on the ruins of Soviet propaganda. It is a new start, albeit with 
a debt to older traditions: a journalism  for a world where this propaganda, as the major cited 
above bleakly concludes, has lost its meaning.  The distant voices of General Secretaries and 
Generals are questioned in a way which would once have been impossible: the materialism of 
Marxism-Leninism, orthodoxy for most of the century, is challenged by resurgent, older faiths 
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such as religion, folk-wisdom, even magic, as Alexievich’s sources seek to make sense of the 
disaster and dizzying social change at the centre of which they find themselves. Decades of 
official atheism--this was a country after all, where, in the first years after the Bolshevik 
Revolution, a group calling itself the “League of the Militant Godless” had received state 
funding34--were being challenged. Now the system which had propagated this godlessness was 
cracking. The system being weak, the older influences’ contradiction of Soviet doctrines 
becomes an attack, and the voices of Alexievich’s contributors are the means by which the attack 
is delivered. In the early section of Boys in Zinc, Alexievich tells her reader, “There are no 
atheists here. And everyone is superstitious.”35 This apparently simple observation is in fact a 
bold challenge to the entire Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan, and to the system itself. 
For what are the troops doing in Afghanistan, if not their international duty to spread Marxism-
Leninism, both in theory and practice, with the ideological atheism that entails? While 
Chernobyl Prayer has also been given the title Voices from Chernobyl in translation, the Russian 
original is Chernobyl Prayer. The very choice of that title seems to serve the same purpose: its 
defiance of official godlessness even more blatant.  
For the voices from the “Prohibited Zone” embrace and share a collective prayer: a faith 
renascent as a response to the materialist system which has failed them so badly. One resident of 
the village of Bely Bereg (the whole of this section of the book is a collection of observations, 
many of them no more than a few lines) summarized the sense of isolation – and the state of an 
entire failing superpower – with  revealing desperation: 
They’ve started coming here. Making movies about us, though we never get to see the 
films. We’ve got no TV or electricity. All we’ve got is the window to look through. And 
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prayer, of course. We used to have Communists instead of God, but now there’s just God 
left.36  
A fellow villager believes that the Book of Revelation has been written with them in mind.  
What’s written in the Bible is all coming true. In the Bible it says about our collective 
farm. And about Gorbachev. It says there’ll be a big leader with a mark on his forehead, 
and a great power will crumble to dust. And then the Day of Judgement will come.37   
Yet another resident of the “Prohibited Zone” refers to the fact that, in Ukrainian, 
“Chernobyl” means “wormwood”38 – the name given in the Book of Revelation to a star which 
poisons the waters of the earth39. Much older creeds return to explain the collapse of the system 
which sought to vanquish them. The official pronouncements are exposed as empty.    
If religion can help to explain the catastrophes which are visited upon the late Soviet Union, 
then other preternatural forces can help to mitigate them. If “everyone is superstitious” when 
serving in Afghanistan, the same is true of people left back in the USSR. One major--and 
therefore one of the more senior officers of the elite whose contribution appears in Boys in Zinc-- 
related that, on his return, his mother “confessed” that he had returned unharmed because she 
had “put a spell” on him.40 Perhaps less surprisingly, the people affected by the Chernobyl 
disaster also turned to magic, whether to the “sorcerers” who “performed in stadiums”41 or the 
“wise women” and “whisperers, witches”42 whom one desperate mother sought out in her search 
for a cure for her son’s radiation sickness. Those who tried to remain above and apart from the 
superstition were troubled by its ubiquity. As the TV psychics offered to “energize” water--and 
thus supposedly make it safe to use--Slava Konstantinova Firsakova, doctor of agricultural 
sciences, despaired of her “colleagues, people with degrees in the sciences” who put three-litre 
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jars close to the screen to give them healing properties.43 It was not just the Marxist-Leninist 
system which was coming to its end. There was, Dr Firsakova concluded when she looked back a 
few years later to the time of the accident, a “Total eclipse of common sense. General 
hysteria.”44 Some of the folk wisdom and superstition seems to take on an especially Russian 
nature. There are numerous references to vodka’s supposed effectiveness as a prevention against 
radiation. It is praised variously as “a first-rate method for restoring the immune system”45, and, 
with the unlikely and unexpected addition of goose excrement, promoted as a means of 
protecting male fertility46. If in Boys in Zinc Alexievich prepares her reader for this assault on 
materialism which her contributors are going to launch (the section mentioned above about the 
fact that there are no atheists, and everyone is superstitious) then the section in Chernobyl Prayer 
where she “interviews herself” is even more explicit.  
The churches filled up again with people – with believers and former atheists. They were 
searching for answers which could not be found in physics or mathematics. The three-
dimensional world came apart, and I have not since met anyone brave enough to swear 
again on the bible of materialism.47 
The overall effect is to create a record--through the medium of ordinary people’s voices--of a 
moment of colossal change. Like the villager, cited above, who reflected that the Communists” 
departure left only God, many of Alexievich’s sources know that they are living the end of an 
era. As they do so, they are not witnessing the birth of a new age so much as a Gramscian 
interregnum--accompanied by the “morbid symptoms”48 (in this case, disastrous military 
adventures and nuclear catastrophe) which Gramsci saw as part of any such era.  
Understanding history through war, and through disaster as warfare 
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To try to make sense of their era, Alexievich’s contributors have, furthermore, frequent 
recourse to more recent history. Their own faith in Soviet mythology may have been shaken so 
that it is shattered, yet they still evoke the relatively recent past to try to understand the horrors of 
the present. The Second World War is an especially powerful point of reference. Victory in the 
war, known usually in Russian as “The Great Patriotic War” (Вели́кая Оте́чественная война́) 
was an endless source of heroic pride to those generations who contributed to it. In today’s 
Russia, the numbers of those who lived through the war, especially those old enough to fight, are 
greatly diminished. The sense of heroic pride is not. President Vladimir Putin’s address on 
Victory Day (May 9th, which is a public holiday in Russia) in 2017 exemplified the way this 
chapter in Russian history has become a sacred national memory. “But there was not, there is not 
and there will never be a power that could defeat our people,” Mr Putin said in his speech on Red 
Square. “They fought to the bitter end defending the homeland, and achieved the seemingly 
impossible.”49 
The rescue workers at Chernobyl are asked to do the impossible, although they do not at first 
realize the nature and scale of the task they face; many of them are not even told where they are 
going until they are underway.50 Villagers living inside the “Prohibited Zone” are in the dark, too 
– at least to begin with. Seeing the sky “buzzing” with aircraft, one concluded, “we must be at 
war.”51 The soldiers drafted to fight this war were baffled too, but in a different way. For one of 
them, it “was a war that was a mystery to us; where there was no telling what was dangerous and 
what wasn’t”52. The Second World War is part of Soviet history with which all the interviewees 
are familiar. It is part of their nation’s story. In the areas closest to Chernobyl, many of which 
were occupied by the Nazis, it is part of personal history, too. In both these senses, national and 
personal, it provides some kind of means of understanding that which is bewildering, terrifying, 
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potentially deadly. It provides ways both of interpreting, and responding. Pursued by police 
officers acting on orders to evacuate the disaster zone, some villagers “hide in the forest. Like 
hiding from the Germans.”53 Even years after the accident, those who experienced it still use the 
Soviet experience in the Second World War as a point of reference. Gennady Grushevoy, a 
member of the Belarusian Parliament, and chairman of the Children of Chernobyl Foundation, 
talked of children being taken to military museums in order to understand  past wars. “But 
actually, nowadays, it’s completely different. On 26 April 1986, we faced war again; and that 
war is not over”54 Again, that was the date when the Chernobyl disaster began. Sergei Sobolev of 
the Chernobyl Shield Association, concluded, “They call it an ‘accident’, a ‘disaster’, but it was 
a war. Our Chernobyl monuments resemble war memorials.”55 Inevitably, given the time of the 
catastrophe, some of the soldiers ordered to the clean-up operation have served in Afghanistan, 
too. At least one volunteered for both56. Those who experienced both--as volunteers or as 
conscripts--have a rare perspective on the two disasters that helped to bring down a superpower. 
The two experiences provided contrasting emotions of relief and despair. “When I got back from 
Afghanistan, I knew I’d live! After Chernobyl, the opposite was true: it was when you were back 
home that it would kill you.”57 Yet another member of the SoldiersChoir felt that his 
understanding would only come with time. “And we’ll understand at least something, I reckon, 
in another twenty or thirty years. I was in Afghanistan (for two years) and in Chernobyl (for 
three months) – the most vivid moments of my life.”58 The reader is left to wonder what this 
soldier would make of it now – now that his “twenty or thirty years” since the disaster have 
passed. Of course, given the levels of radiation to which he was exposed, it is very possible that 
these “most vivid moments of his life” in fact hastened his death.  
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For the contributors to Boys in Zinc, the Second World War--and the subsequent Soviet 
portrayal of the heroism of that war--act as a great source of inspiration; so great, in fact, that it 
makes the disillusionment which follows all the more crushing. “I wanted to be at war. Only not 
this war, but the Great Patriotic War,”59 says one civilian employee. One private finds the 
heroism turned on its head. “We played the part of the Germans. That’s what one guy told me,”60 
he reflected of the way the Afghans they had supposedly come to help actually saw them: as 
occupiers. The heroic Soviet martial image of the Second World War serves only to disillusion 
those who have been inspired by it when they crash into the reality of Afghanistan. “Maybe I 
couldn’t imagine a different kind of war, one that wasn’t like the Great Patriotic War. I loved 
watching war films ever since I was little,”61  a civilian employee reflected, apparently still 
shocked at the memory of “Men lying there, scorched all over. Mutilated.”62 There are echoes 
elsewhere of other, journalistic, accounts of that conflict which, as President Putin’s words, 
above, attest, still stand as the heroic highpoint of Russia’s twentieth centuryOther soldiers 
whom Alexievich encounters have undergone different transformations. Schooled in Soviet 
mythology, they look to tales of the “Great Patriotic War” to understand their experience. In 
these changed times, the effect of those stories is actually to promote self-doubt; even self-
loathing. “We played the Germans” seems to sum it up. Alexievich’s technique here is a new one 
for new times. She draws on older, familiar, narratives, to assist audiences trying to understand 
that which they struggle to comprehend. The propaganda of the Soviet journalism which went 
before is no longer credible.  
The end of Soviet journalism 
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Part of that “We played the Germans” disenchantment stemmed from the fact that the only 
journalism known to many of Alexievich’s contributors was propagandistic Soviet journalism: 
its purpose often to conceal by omission rather than to reveal. When revelations of reality 
eventually came, readers were disillusioned. As they became more numerous, Soviet 
journalism’s days were numbered. Reflecting on his own experience--referred to above--as a 
resident of Moscow kept in ignorance at the time of the Chernobyl disaster, and of the 
conclusions he was therefore able to draw on the state of Soviet journalism, McNair has written, 
“For Soviet journalists, those ten days of enforced silence turned out with hindsight to be the 
final, desperate gesture of a party hierarchy whose rigid control of the mass communications 
system was by early 1986 already breaking down.”63 Alexievich seems to sense this very 
strongly. The first reference to journalism the reader of Boys in Zinc encounters is, “Here they 
call the journalists ‘storytellers’”64 – the inverted commas indicating that the term “storytellers” 
is referred to with a derogatory sneer. Such journalists are not seekers after truth in Afghanistan 
but the inventors of fantasy. As Roderic Braithwaite has pointed out of the political decision 
which lay behind this kind of reporting, “To maintain the fiction that it was not a real war, Soviet 
journalists were forbidden to report the fighting or the casualties.”65 Most of the official Soviet 
journalism depicted in the two books studied seems to be perceived in this way. The soldiers in 
Afghanistan, all of those affected by the Chernobyl disaster, the author herself, all seem to have 
reached the same conclusion as McNair: the rigid control of mass communication was breaking 
down. It might continue to try to function. It was not to be believed. 
Simply, Soviet Journalism--facing unprecedented political challenges in this period--is 
not equal to the task. “I met some cameramen from Moscow,” Alexievich writes soon after her 
arrival in Afghanistan: 
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They were filming the loading of a “black tulip” – an A12 plane that takes coffins back 
home. Without raising their eyes they tell me that the dead are dressed in old army uniforms 
from the 1940s, still with breeches instead of trousers; sometimes even these uniforms are in 
short supply, and they’re put in the coffin without being dressed. Old wooden boards, rusty 
nails. 
The reader knows that none of these details will ever be seen on air. So does Alexievich, who 
is led to ask, “Who will believe me if I write about this?”66 Perhaps one of the most striking 
episodes is the experiences of the cameraman Sergey Gurin (he whose favourite writer was 
Hemingway). His is an account of filming that which is illusion, while ignoring that which really 
told the story: like an old woman who had been told to clear away the contaminated earth, but, as 
she did so, kept as fertilizer the manure that lay on top of it. “Pity I didn’t film that,”67 Gurin 
admitted. Regarding illusion, he goes on location where livestock which have been contaminated 
are being buried in a pit. “I stood with my back to the trench and shot an episode in the finest 
Soviet documentary tradition: bulldozer drivers reading their copy of Pravda.”68 Sobolev, of the 
Chernobyl Shield Association, later involved in trying to protect for posterity the memory of 
what happened, saw the other side of this. “We have no documentary material about how people 
were evacuated or livestock was moved out. There must be no filming of a disaster, only of 
heroism!”69 The disaffection among soldiers serving in Afghanistan is as severe. “They wrote in 
the newspapers that our soldiers were building bridges and planting avenues of friendship and 
our doctors were treating Afghan women and children,”70 remembered one private of the time 
when he was training. With the benefit of experience, another gave a grimmer, more realistic, 
assessment of what the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was really doing. “I saw so many ruined 
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kishlaks1. But not a single kindergarten, not a single school that had been built, or tree that had 
been planted – the ones they wrote about in our newspapers.”71 The same soldier related how 
those rosy accounts had especially infuriated him personally, as he recalled his comrade, with 
whom he used to mock what they read as they sat in the common toilet, who had since been 
killed. “Not a word about us, fuck it…But only yesterday forty of our boys were torn to shreds. 
Two days earlier I was sitting here in the latrine with one of them and reading these papers, 
hooting with laughter”72 because such accounts were so out of touch with the reality they were 
confronting.  
The overall impression is not one of journalism at the end of the twentieth century, but much 
closer to its beginning in the British perspective. The anger of the soldiers in Boys in Zinc echoes 
the cynical voices of troops encountering journalists in the poems of the First World War, a 
conflict, in which, as Philip Knightley argued, “More deliberate lies were told than in any other 
period of history, and the whole apparatus of the state went into action to suppress the truth.”73 
The laughter of the Soviet infantryman in the toilet is a reaction which Siegfried Sassoon’s 
characters might readily recognize. As the wounded soldier at the end of his poem “Editorial 
Impressions” snidely suggests – having  been regaled with a reporter’s facile observations about 
“that splendour shine/ Which makes us win” – “Ah yes, but it’s the press that leads the way.”74 
The First World War was seen by those who fought in it – and, subsequently, by some of those 
who reported it, as a shameful episode in the history of British journalism. As Sir Philip Gibbs, 
one of the war correspondents later wrote, “There was no need for censorship of our despatches. 
                                                          
1 A small village or settlement 
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We were our own censors.”75 This kind of reporting led to the kind of cynicism which Sassoon’s 
wounded soldier sneered at the correspondent in the poem. 
Now we see the same some sixty-five to seventy years later in the Soviet Union. In Boys in 
Zinc, the reporting of Afghanistan does the same for Soviet journalism. One civilian began their 
account, “How did I end up here? It’s very simple. I believed everything they wrote in the 
newspapers.”76 For another private, it was the end of belief. “Afghanistan set me free. It cured 
me of the belief that everything is right, that they write the truth in the newspapers, and show the 
truth on the television.”77 For this young soldier, it was a liberation. Afghanistan and Chernobyl 
were two national traumas which, even as they played a role in ending a social and political 
system, put Soviet journalism to the test. It failed and, in consequence, lost the trust of its 
audiences to such an extent that it could never recover.  
Foreign journalists appear only as minor characters, but their presence is, for all that, highly 
significant. They are absent from Boys in Zinc, the presence of western reporters hardly welcome 
in the Cold War-era Soviet armed forces (although as the time for withdrawal in 1989 
approached, there were opportunities for international correspondents to go to report from the 
Soviet side). In Chernobyl Prayer, foreign reporters appear as harbingers of change: their ability 
to stake out the graveside of a Chernobyl firefighter a sign of the new freedom of movement they 
enjoyed under perestroika. “The cemetery is besieged by foreign journalists. Continue to wait,”78 
is the message the hapless widow of the firefighter hears over the walkie-talkie of a colonel who 
has been assigned to accompany her. Here the foreign journalists are an unsettling, yet unseen, 
force. They are to be avoided so that they cannot see the reality of what the widow must suffer. 
At other points, they materialize to ask questions unlike those posed by the more obedient Soviet 
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reporters and cameramen. “Would you take your children somewhere where there was plague or 
cholera?”79 asks a German reporter of a mother who has fled post-Soviet bloodletting in 
Kirghizia, only to end up in the disaster area. An “English journalist” tried and failed to learn 
from helicopter pilots, who had flown over the reactor, whether exposure to radiation had 
affected their sex lives. “Not one of them would speak frankly,”80 said Sobolev, who had 
accompanied the reporter. Undeterred, the reporter gets the full story from the waitresses in the 
café where the meeting with the pilots had taken place. “Slavs do not talk about these things. It’s 
unacceptable,” Sobolev protested, in his remarks to Alexievich. The arrival of the foreign 
journalists is an intrusion, their questions a breach of established cultural mores, and, as such a 
sign of change.  
Then there is Alexievich’s place as journalist in her narratives. Aside from  locating herself in 
a wider Russian literature-journalism tradition, and noting the personal challenges of writing 
about the war in Afghanistan and about the Chernobyl disaster, Alexievich’s voice rarely 
intrudes directly. On occasion, one of her sources will address her. For example, one 
explainshow she should describe him –“‘director of the apocalypse zone’. (He laughs). You can 
write that.”81 Other than moments like that we are rarely aware of her presence. Yet she is there, 
of course – an omnipresent and omniscient author, at least in the sense that she has gathered, 
selected, and structured the material which goes into her work. They may be others’ words, but 
ultimately what emerges is her account. One of her interviewees is the journalist Anatoly 
Shimansky. He too addresses Alexievich directly – although he could be speaking her words. 
“I’ll give you my notebook. It’ll just end up lying among my papers. Well, maybe I’ll show it to 
my children when they grow up. It is history, after all.”82  
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Conclusion: a new picture of the world 
“What’s really lacking in all these theatres is sufficient people who are deep experts on 
the language and the region to actually produce the options to ministers,” complained Rory 
Stewart, then Chair of the British House of Commons Defence Select Committee, in a 2014 
interview. He described the situation in the British Foreign Office where, after the Russian 
invasion of Crimea, “The Crimea desk officer had to be moved across from the South 
Caucasus—and the Russian analysis section had been closed in 2010.”83 Stewart was referring to 
the way in which Western policy makers had failed to keep an eye on what was happening in the 
former Soviet Union, and arguing that, as a result, dramatic developments which redrew the map 
of Europe had not been foreseen. There is a lesson in his words for journalism too. Like 
intelligence gathering and diplomacy, its effectiveness relies upon the quality of the information 
sources it has at its disposal. If Western diplomacy failed to anticipate the invasion of Crimea, 
then Western journalism, in the shape of the results of the 2016 British decision to leave the 
European Union, and the election later that year of Donald Trump as President of the United 
States, has had its blind spots, too. While there were rare voices who predicted these outcomes, 
the majority did not. They had probably been talking to the wrong people. It is true that 
Alexievich is looking at the recent past, rather than trying to predict the future – but this 
approach of gathering countless testimonies from mainly non-elite sources might have a wider 
application, too.   
Svetlana Alexievich talked to the people she needed to -- those “hundreds of voices” she had 
heard – in order to tell the story of her changing times. Her methods have attracted criticism. In a 
2016 article for The New Republic, Sophie Pinkham charged that Alexievich’s “work opts for 
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subjective recollection over hard evidence; she does not attempt to confirm any of her witnesses” 
accounts, and she chooses her stories for their narrative power, not as representative samples.”84 
Pinkham went on, “by seeking to straddle both literature and history, Alexievich ultimately 
succeeds at neither.”85 Alexievich referred to such criticism in her Nobel lecture. “I work with 
missing history,” she explained. “I am often told, even now, that what I write isn’t literature, it’s 
a document. What is literature today? Who can answer that question? We live faster than ever 
before. Content ruptures form.” These are all reasonable points, although her later statement, in 
the same passage, that, “There are no borders between fact and fabrication, one flows into the 
other,” seems ambiguous. Is this a lament in the era of fake news, or a defence of subjective 
interpretation? Her next sentence suggested the latter. “Witnesses are not impartial. In telling a 
story, humans create, they wrestle time like a sculptor does marble. They are actors and 
creators.”86 The creative element of Alexievich’s own work has raised questions from other 
commentators. “L’écrivain qui a défini son genre comme un ‘roman des voix’ est donc à l’écoute 
de personnages dont elle réécrit les propos pour forger des images a forte charge émotionelle,”2 
conclude Ackerman and Lemarchand. Still, this is a new era requiring a new kind of explanation. 
There is perhaps an echo here of Michael Herr’s verdict on the reporting of the Vietnam War: 
“Conventional journalism could no more reveal this war than conventional firepower could win 
it.’87  
For all her obvious admiration of, and inspiration from, the great works of Russian literature, 
Alexievich is also frank about the simpler interpretations of existence from which her sources 
draw strength.  
                                                          
2 “The writer who has defined her genre as a ‘novel of voices’ is therefore listening to characters whose remarks 
she rewrites to form images with a strong emotional charge.” (Translation by the author) 
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What was most interesting of all in those early days was not talking with the scientists, 
not with the officials or the high-ranking military men, but with the old peasants. They 
lived without Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, without the Internet, yet their minds somehow 
made space for the new picture of the world. Their consciousness did not crumble.88 
“Their minds somehow made space for the new picture of the world.” This was the key to 
survival not only through the Chernobyl and Afghanistan disasters, but through the whole 
collapse of the USSR. Alexievich’s work may depart from the straight lines of conventional 
reporting, but it surely has huge value as a form of journalism, and a form of history: not 
necessarily history as written by the victors, but history as understood by those who fought 
against the confiscation of their past, and all the while made space for the new picture of the 
world.  
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